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Marvin S. Cohen 
Decision Science Consortium, Inc. 
The Problem 
Attempts to replicate probabilistic reasoning in expert systems have typically 
overlooked a critical ingredient of that process. Probabilistic analysis 
typically requi�es extensive judgments regarding interdependencies among 
hypotheses and data, and regarding the appropriateness of various alternative 
models. The application of such models is often an iterative process, in 
which the plausibility of the results confirms or disconfirms the validity of 
assumptions made in building the model. In current expert systems, by 
contrast, probabilistic information is encapsulated within modular rules 
(involving, for example, "certainty factors"), and there is no mechanism for 
reviewing the overall form of the probability argument or the validity of the 
judgments entering into it. 
The present work addresses this problem in the context of conflict resolution 
in expert systems for image analysis. It involves the design of an expert 
system inference framework in which probabilistic statements and rules are 
regarded as assumptions which are explicitly tracked and reevaluated when they 
lead to conflict among different sources of evidence or lines of reasoning. 
Two conceptions of conflict and conflict resolution have been implicit in most 
approaches to this area. From one point of view, divergence among lines of 
reasoning can be regarded as stochastic; it is expected to occur some small 
percentage of the time, due to the chance accumulation of small errors or 
"noise" in an imperfect process of "measurement". From another point of view, 
however, divergence can be regarded as a result of faulty beliefs; that is, 
conflicting results are taken as evidence that one or more premises or forms 
of argument that led to the conflict are mistaken. 
These two conceptions of conflict lead to different rationales for the process 
of combining evidence or lines of reasoning. From the first point of view, 
the object is to reduce variance by a blind process of "averaging" akin to 
that in which chance errors tend to cancel one another out across repeated 
measurements. From the other point of view, the object is to improve the 
overall truth of a system of beliefs--to explicitly identify potentially er­
roneous steps in the argument and to change them. 
& New Approach: Conceptual Outline 
The present system, called the Non-Monotonic Probabilist (NMP), regards con­
flict as jointly knowledge-based and stochastic. It reduces conflict by a 
process of non-monotonic reasoning prior to statistical aggregation by prob­
abilistic rules. In particular, non-monotonic processes operate on and modify 
the assumptions and judgments embodied in a belief function model. At the 
same time, however, the non-monotonic processes are guided by measures of com­
pleteness of support provided by the belief function calculus. "Fuzzifying" 
the latter measures, in turn, ensures a simple but graded process of high 
level control. 
Shaferian belief functions are used as the basic measure of uncertainty, 
rather than Bayesian probabilities, for several reasons: they do not require 
numerical definiteness of inputs beyond what the evidence supports; they 
provide an explicit representation of the quality of an inferential argument; 
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and they permit "modular" probabilistic analyses based on only subsets of the 
evidence. Shafer's system permits a variety of useful specialized models for 
representing evidence. One of these special cases is (very nearly) Bayesian 
probability theory itself; Shaferian belief functions can represent chance as 
Bayesian probabilities do, but permit a simple assessment of the quality or 
reliability of those probabilities as well. 
The Non-Monotonic Probabilist embeds a belief function model within a super­
structure of non-monotonic reasoning. Non-monotonic logic is a method of 
reasoning with incomplete information, in which assumptions may be adopted and 
subsequently revised when they lead to contradictory results. Non-monotonic 
logic, however, has been exact both in the statements to which it applies and 
in its own control mechanisms. As a result, it fails to capture the notion 
that support for hypotheses may be graded; and the selection among alternative 
equally consistent belief revisions is highly arbitrary. The NMP system ad­
dresses these shortcomings by applying non-monotonic logic to the application 
of an uncertainty calculus, and by utilizing measures derived from that cal­
culus to direct the process of belief revision itself. 
In the specification of measures for the control of non-monotonic reasoning in 
NMP, fuzzy logic has been used. It provides a precise calculus for vague or 
imprecise concepts. It thus makes possible the redefinition, in continuous 
form, of concepts which occur discretely in traditional non-monotonic systems. 
In NMP, for example, "conflict" is a matter of degree, and so is the status of 
a statement or rule as an "assumption". As a result, NMP incorporates a 
graded control process for belief revision, in which assumptions are subject 
to retraction only so long as their resistence to revision is outweighed by 
the strength of the conflict. 
Applications of NMP to feature identification in aerial photographic images 
are being explored. Conflicting results may be obtained from the application 
of multiple operators to a pixel array, or from combining extraneous informa­
tion and expectations with one another or with the outcome of a bottom-up 
analysis. In these cases, the appropriate response often is a reevaluation of 
the reliability of the conflicting sources. Alternatively, their assumed in­
dependence might be questioned, for example by revising the segmentation of 
the image; or new analyses might be initiated to confirm hypotheses for which 
there is as yet no support, but which could account for the anomaly. 
In any probabilistic argument, whether Bayesian or Shaferian, assumptions of 
various types are required. Conflict among diverse lines of reasoning can 
(and should) force them into the open. To the extent that assumptions are ex­
plicitly tracked and reevaluated, conflict is an occasion for increasing the 
validity of a system of beliefs, rather than for meaningless statistical 
compromise. 
In the following sections, we explore the rationale and the design of NMP in 
somewhat more detail. After briefly reviewing the theory of belief functions, 
we look at some anomalous results that occur when the belief function calculus 
is applied to conflicting evidence. Then we describe some of the NMP process­
es by which such anomalies are eliminated. 
Iheory of Belief Functions 
In the theory of belief functions introduced by Shafer (1976), Bayesian prob­
abilities are replaced by a concept of evidential support. The contrast, ac­
cording to Shafer (1981; Shafer and Tversky, 1983) is between the chance that 
a hypothesis is true, on the one hand, and the chance that the evidence � 
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(or proves) that the hypothesis is true, on the other. Thus, we shift focus 
from truth of a hypothesis to the interpretation of the evidence. As a 
result, the system (a) is able to provide an explicit measure of quality of 
evidence, (b) is less prone to require a degree of definiteness in inputs that 
exceeds the knowledge of the expert, and (c) permits segmentation of reasoning 
into analyses that depend on independent bodies of evidence. 
In Shafer's calculus, support m (') is allocated not to hypotheses, but to� 
of hypotheses. Shafer allows us, therefore, to talk of the support we can 
place in any subset of the set of all hypotheses. In the case of three 
hypotheses, H1, H2 and H3, for example, we could allocate support to H1, H2, 
H3, (H1 or H2} ,  (H1 or H3} ,  (H2 or H3} ,  and (H1 or H2 or H3} .  As with 
probability, the total support across these subsets will sum to 1, and each 
support m (') will be between 0 and 1. It is natural, then, to say that m (') 
gives the probability that what the evidence means is that the truth lies 
somewhere in the indicated subset. 
This device, of allocating support to subsets of hypotheses, enables us to 
represent the reliability of probability assessments. Suppose, for example, 
that the presence of a certain type of texture in an image region is as­
sociated with a building 70% of the time and with other labels 30% of the 
time, based on frequency data from a set of training photographs. If we are 
confident that an image now being analyzed is representative of the training 
set, we may have m (building)- .7 and m (other)- .3. But if there is reason 
to doubt the relevance of the frequency data to the present problem (e. g., due 
to geological or cultural differences between the two geographical areas), we 
may discount this support function by allocating some percentage of support to 
the universal set. For example, with a discount rate of 30%, we get 
m (building) � .49, m (other) - . 21, and m ({building, other} ) - .30. The latter 
reflects the chance that the frequency data is irrelevant. 
Evidence is combined in Shafer's theory by Dempster's rule. The essential in­
tuition is simply that the meaning of the combination of two pieces of 
evidence is the intersection, or common element, of the two subsets constitut­
ing their separate meanings. For example, if evidence E1 means (H1 or H2), 
and evidence E2 means (H2 or H3), then the combi�ation E1 + E2 means H2. 
Since the two pieces of evidence are assumed to be independent, the probabil­
ity of any given combination of meanings is the product of their separate 
probabilities. The probability that the combined evidence means any par­
ticular subset X is the sum of the products for all combinations that have X 
as their intersection. When a combination of possible meanings has a null 
intersection, we know that these meanings cannot co-occur. Thus, the sum of 
products is normalized to exclude that combination. 
Conflict Qf Evidence 
To what extent does belief function theory yield inferences which are intui­
tive and plausible in specific applications? A topic of special concern in 
this regard is conflict of evidence. Zadeh (1984) recently raised an example 
of the following sort. Suppose we have two experts who we believe to be very 
reliable and who produce conflicting judgments. For example, there are three 
possible interpretations of an object x in a specified location: H1--x is a 
field; H2--x is a forest; H3--x is a building. Analyst A, using photographic 
evidence, assigns . 99 support to H1 and .01 to H2; analyst B, using indepen­
dent human intelligence information, assigns .99 support to H3 and .01 to H2. 
We have the following two support functions, and may combine them by 
Dempster's rule: 
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Table 1 
mA(
.) ms(
.) mAB (
.) 
Hl 0.99 0 0 
H2 0.01 0.01 1.00 
H3 0 0.99 0 
The counterintuitive result, according to Zadeh, is that exclusive support is 
now assigned to H2, a hypothesis that neither expert regarded as likely. 
Moreover, the result is independent of the probabilities assigned to H1 or H3. 
Shafer's response (in press) is cogent, but ultimately, we feel, off the mark. 
If we really regard these experts as perfectly reliable, Shafer says, the ar­
gument as stated is correct. After all, analyst A says that H3 is impossible, 
and analyst B rules out H1; that leaves H2 as the only remaining possibility. 
(Note that exactly the same result is obtained in Bayesian updating if we in­
terpret the m (') as likelihoods of the evidence given the hypothesis.) On the 
other hand, Shafer argues that experts are seldom in fact perfectly reliable. 
A more reasonable procedure would be to "discount" the belief functions sup­
plied by the experts to reflect our doubt in the reliability of their reports. 
Recailing that we regard these experts as highly reliable (though not 
perfect), suppose we discount analyst A's belief function by 1% and analyst 
B's by 2%. The result is the following: 
Table 2 
mA (
.) mB(
. ) mAB (
") 
Hl 0.9801 0 .656 
H2 0.0099 0.0098 .013 
H3 0 0.9702 .325 
{Hl,H2,H3} 0.01 0.02 .007 
We now have a "bimodal" belief function, with the preponderance of support 
going to H1 and H3. This appears, at first look, to be an intuitively 
plausible result: it reflects our feeling, which we represented in the form 
of discount rates, that analyst A Qr analyst B (or both) could possibly be 
unreliable. 
Note, however, what a vast difference a small amount of discounting makes. In 
Table 1, after combination by Dempster's rule, there was exclusive support for 
H2. In Table 2, final support for H2 is only slightly greater than 1%. The 
second thing to notice is the large discrepancy between mAB (H1) and mAB (H2). 
Although we did in fact discount B at twice the rate as A, the actual numbers 
(2% and 1%, respectively) and the difference between them were very small. It 
is by no means clear that the resulting difference in support for H1 and H3 is 
intuitively plausible. More to the point, the sensitivity of the result for 
all three hypotheses to very small differences in discount rates is 
disturbing. Finally, to dramatize the sensitivity even further, note that if 
support for {Hl,H2,H3} were 0 for both experts, and if A assigned 0 support to 
H2, and B assigned 0 support to H2, these very small changes render Dempster's 
rule indeterminate. 
Given the degree of conflict between the two analysts, it seems likely that 
our original assessment of the reliability was mistaken. Suppose then we dis­
count A by 29% and B by 30%. We now get: 
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Table 3 
rnA (
.) mB (
.) mAB (
.) 
Hl .7029 0 .4243 
H2 .0071 .007 .0085 
H3 0 .693 .4044 
{Hl, H2, H3} .29 .30 .1751 
Support for H1 and H2 after combination is now roughly equal, certainly a more 
intuitive result. Then should we have discounted A and B more in the first 
place? According to Shafer, this is indeed the case; the fault is not in the 
theory, but in the initial allocation of support. 
The example highlights a deeper problem in belief function theory: reliability 
is to be assessed � 1f we had no knowledge of the evidence actually provided 
(Shafer in press). We are thus not permitted to� the conflict between 
analyst A and analyst B as a clue regarding their capabilities or as a guide 
to the appropriate amount of discounting. In ordinary reasoning, however, as 
just illustrated, it is quite natural to reassess the credibility of an infor­
mation source in the light of what that source says, or in the light of con­
flict or corroboration by another source. 
There have been efforts to develop Bayesian models that address this issue 
(e.g., Gardefors, Hansson, and Sahlin, 1983). The essential difference be­
tween this work and Shafer's is that the former conditionalizes the assessment 
of an expert's credibility on what he (and other experts) have actually said 
(see Shafer, 1984; Cohen, Watson, and Barrett, 1985). This work however, 
lacks most, if not all, of the virtues of the belief function representation. 
Formulations which conditionalize on the evidence become extremely complex 
even for the simplest examples. Little progress has been made in deriving 
rules for the combination of evidence involving the full range of cases to 
which Dempster's rule applies. Finally, the pervasive role of prior probabil­
ities in this work is incompatible with the segmentation of evidence into in­
dependent arguments which is a significant virtue of Shafer's system. 
NMP addresses this problem in a different way, not by revising the belief 
function calculus, but by supplementing it. It retains the simplicity and 
modularity of Shafer's representation, while embedding it within a corrective 
process of qualitative reasoning. 
Fuzzy Control Processes for NM£ 
NMP deploys a set of fuzzy measures to track and revise assumptions, and 
generally to guide the application of a belief function calculus. In a cer­
tain sense, these measures are ad hoc. However, they enable us to avoid an 
elaborate calculus, like second-order probabilities, which would be com­
putationably unwieldly, and indeed equally� hoc, for this purpose. They 
provide a graded process of high-level control through a reasonably plausible 
and simple set of definitions. 
Conflict. A simple measure of degree of conflict in a belief function 
is the following. Let S be a subset of hypotheses and S its complement. 
Q - {S, S} ,  then 
(1) � conflict (Q) - 2 min[ Bel (S), Bel (S)). 
If 
Where � (') is the degree of membership in a fuzzy set and takes values between 
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0 and 1. This can be justified in two ways. From the fuzzy logic point of 
view, we might regard it a� the membership function for the intersection of 
belief in S and belief in S, i. e. , a contradiction. Multiplication by 2 nor­
malizes the measure, so that maximum llconflict{Q)-1 is achieved when Bel(S) -
Bel (S) - . 5. Secondly, note that is it equivalent to the following 
expression: 
1 
- · S 
{Bel(S)+Bel(S)} - 2Bel(S) Bel(S)+Bel( ) { 
I Be 1 ( S) -Be i ( S) I l - -
·when we assume, without loss of generality, that Bel(S)�Bel(S). This expres­
sion intuitively captures the notion of conflict in a belief function: the 
first bracketed expression is the relative similarity of the degrees of belief 
in S and S; the larger this is, the greater the conflict. The second 
bracketed expression is the total committed belief; to the extent that the 
belie.f function is "discounted" by assigning support to the universal set 
{S, S} ,  we regard the conflict as reduced. In short, the maximum Bel(S) 
doesn't matter since increasing it (with Bel(S) constant) has two opposing 
effects: it increases the difference between Bel(S) and Bel(S), but also in­
creases the total committed belief. 
Conflict resolution is prompted, however, by "significant" conflict, and the 
degree of significance required may be a variable function of the problem 
domain. A simple, though somewhat ad hoc, way to accomplish this is to define 
y 
llsignif, conflict(Q) - llconflict (Q) 
where Y is a power to which llconflict(Q) is raised. Increasing Y has the ef­
fect of requiring higher degrees of conflict to achieve "significance". 
Support lists. Dependencies among statements in a standard non-monotonic sys­
tem (Doyle, 1979) are represented (primarily) by data structures called sup­
port lists. A support list justification for a statement has the form 
(SL <inlist> <outlist>). Such a justification is a valid reason for belief in 
the statement if every statement in its inlist is believed and every statement 
in its outlist is not believed. A non-monotonic justification is a support 
list whose outlist is non-empty . A statement which has a non-monotonic jus� 
tification is accepted provisionally and may be used in subsequent reasoning: 
it is rejected when and if some member of its outlist comes to be believed. 
Similarly, in NMP each rule and each statement is associated with a set of 
reasons, in the form of a support list. However, in place of a discrete 
classification (inlist vs. outlist) we substitute a "fuzzy membership 
function, " i. e. , a continuum from 1n to out. Moreover, it is the current 
Shaferian support assignment to a statement, rather than the statement itself, 
which has reasons or which serves as a reason. 
Location of a s-tatement Si on the support list continuum for a second state­
ment S ; or a rule R depends on only two things: (a) the presence of Si on a 
list o'f possible reasons for s1 or R, and (b) the amount of support for the 
universal set {Si, �i} .  In particular, where Si is a possible reason for Sj, 
(2a) 
llout-S (Si) - m(Si ,'si) 
- j.· 
llin-S. (Si) - 1-m(Si, Si) - Bel(Si)+Bel(Si) 
- J 
where in and out hereafter refer to the inlist and outlist membership func­
tions respectively. Correspondingly, when a rule R is a possible reason for 
sj, 
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(2b) 
�QY.t-S
j 
(R) - mR(Sj ,Sj) 
�in-S (R) - 1-mR (Sj, Sj) j 
where mR(') is the support function assigned by R. 
These measures capture a very simple intuition. They place the potential 
reasons for s1 (or R) in an order corresponding to the relevance of that 
reason in thi� particular application, i.e., the reliability or completeness 
of evidence underlying each reason. To the extent that confidence in s1 or 
use of R depends upon reasons with high �out• they rely on unproven (but not 
disproven) suppositions. (We argue that tliis is inevitable in any probabil­
istic analysis.) 
What determines the content of the list of possible reasons? For a statement 
s1, it contains (a) the rules in the system which have a support assignment 
fOr Sj in the consequent, and (b) the statements which occur in the antece­
dents of those rules. The possible reasons for a rule may include a list of 
potential similarities (or absences of potential dissimilarities) between the 
target application of the system and the exemplars upon which it was trained. 
They may also include specifications of model assumptions used to generate 
support assignments. Finally, they implicitly include assertions of indepen­
dence of the evidence summarized by the rule from evidence utilized in all 
other rules of the system. 
An elaboration of (2) is motivated by the observation that a statement Si 
which is in s1 •s support list can have no impact on Sj unless there is a rule 
linking them \with Si in the antecedent and a support assignment for Sj in the 
consequent). Also, of course, a rule R can have no impact on s1 without the 
(at least partial) satisfaction of its antecedent by a statement. Thus, we 
must take members of the support list for a statement s 1 to be � of state­
ments and rules (Si,Ri), rather than statements and rules separately. We now 
get: 
(2') 
min[�out-S (Si)•�out-S (R)] 
- j 
-
-
min[m(Si,Si),mR(Sj,Sj)] 
� 1n- S. ( S i 'R) - 1- � out- S . ( S ' R) . J J 
A statement or a rule is an assumption to the degree that its acceptance or 
use depends on what is possible, rather than on what is supported by evidence. 
The following is a simple measure of that concept: 
(3) 
where n is 
rule pairs 
proportion 
� assumption<8j) 
\ � (S,R) L out-S 
(S,R) - j 
n 
the total possible evidence for sj, i.e .• the number of statement­
in the support list for Sj. � assumption<s1) is simply the (fuzzy) 
of Sj's reasons which are out, i.e., unsupported by evidence. 
Foundations. In standard non-monotonic logic a contradiction in the set of 
accepted statements triggers a process of dependency-directed backtracking, in 
which reasons for statements involved in the contradiction are found and 
revised. A comparable process takes place in NMP. In NMP, however, the 
process by which beliefs are selected for revision is non-arbitrary. It is 
guided by measures that reflect both the importance of a reason for a state-
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ment and the degree to which the reason itself lacks evidential support. 
One requirement of dependency-directed backtracking is the ability to find 
statements or rules which have an indirect impact on a given statement or 
rule. Suppose a statement-rule pair (Si,R) is in the support list for Sj. 
Then it has a direct effect on the support assignment for S; to the extent 
that s1 or its complement is believed and to the extent that R assigns a non­
discounted support function to �i· Other pairs of statements and rules, 
however, may have an indirect et�ect on s. by having an impact on Si or R. 
All these pairs are, to a degree, part ofl the "foundations" of Sj. We measure 
this as follows: 
(4) 
In effect, the min function says that the chain of impact linking (Sk,Rk) to 
Sj via (Sj-l•Rj-1) ... (Sk+l•Rk+l) is only as strong as its weakest link. 
To what extent is a statement Sk by itself (or a rule R by itself) part of the 
foundations of Sj? Here, we get: 
(5) � foundations-s.<8k)- suR
p[�foundations-s.(Sk,R)] • J . J 
i.e., Sk's impact is equal to the impact of the most effective chain to which 
it belongs. Similarly, 
�foundations-s.(R) - s�p[�foundations-S·(Sk,R)] · 
J k J 
Suppositions. Suppositions are assumptions with an impact. More precisely, 
the statements and rules which s. requires us to "suppose" are 
(a) in the foundations of Sj, an� (b) assumptions in their own right. The degree to which a statement Sk (or a rule R) is a supposition of Sj is given 
by the following: 
(6) �supposition-s.<Sk) - min[�foundations-s.<5k)•�assumption<Sk)]. 
J J 
Dependency-directed backtrackin�. There are a variety of ways that these 
measures, or other similar ones, might be used to direct backtracking and 
belief revision. Here we give one approach. Suppose that Q- {Sj,Sj} has a 
high degree of conflict. The strategy is simply to select the maximal sup­
position for Sj as the "culprit" C, and then to "negate" C by revising the 
maximal member of C's Qgtlist. More precisely, we select a rule or statement 
C such that 
max[�supposition-S. (C')] - �supposition-s.(C). 
J J 
Then we select a statement-rule pair (S,R) for revision such that 
s���· [�out-c<
S' ,R')J - �out-c(S,R). 
Finally, S or R may be revised, depending on which has the least evidential 
support, i.e., max[m(S, S) ,mR (C, C)]. 
Conflict as the control QYgi revision. No revisions in fact take place unless 
the degree .of conflict is serious enough to justify them. This involves a 
simple comparison between the measure of significance of the conflict and a 
measure of the "resistance" to revision for our best available candidate. 
Thus, if 
�signif. conflict(Q) � �in-c(S,R), 
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S or R may be revised; otherwise, not. 
Conclusion 
How does NMP relate in general to currently existing AI software tools? Tools 
for building expert systems now exist which provide for quantitative reasoning 
about uncertainty (e.g., EMYCIN). Other systems permit qualitative reasoning 
about and revision of assumptions (e.g., DUCK). NMP is a superset 'of these 
capabilities. Our description of it has dwelled on its capability of combin­
ing aspects of both: i.e., qualitative reasoning about a quantitative model, 
and quantitative measures to guide that reasoning. But note that each extreme 
can be achieved in NMP itself as a special case. If no assumptions are as­
sociated with rules or statements, we get a pure system for probabilistic in­
ference (like EMYCIN or PROSPECTOR, with a Shaferian belief function 
calculus). On the other hand, if all belief functions were to allocate full 
support between some single hypothesis and the universal set, we get a pure 
non-monotonic system (like DUCK). 
The problems with these extremes are complementary. Pure probabilistic sys­
tems never learn anything new about their probabilistic beliefs and assump­
tions from the experience of applying them. Pure non-monotonic systems do 
learn, but they have an arbitrariness and an all-or-none quality about the new 
beliefs they acquire. Our argument, quite simply, is that both capabilities 
are needed, and that satisfactory systems will, in general, require their 
combination. 
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